

REEL 9 (TAPK)

- 1 P -

WACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

BEVARRID:

Mr. Dulles, do I take it, that you think so-called creeping Socialism in a democratic society is not a road to Communism, itself?

DULLES:

Yes, it's rather important, I think, to define our terms. The Soviet have befuddled this whole area by, at times, talking of their regime as a socialistic regime. In the terms in which we know it, of course, that isn't true, because there are Socialist regimes in the world which are very anti-communist, have nothing whatever to do with communism, and I gather when you speak of creeping Socialism, you have in mind the slow take-over by government of more and more of the economy of the countries. Of course communists have taken over the whole economy of the country, to start with, and people's freedoms with it, which has not happened in Socialist regimes, to speak of. I would think that that was the road that the communists, themselves, would choose to take over the country. I would feel that looking back on the historical side of it, that what they like to do in countries that have democratic parliamentary regimes, they try to infiltrate those regimes by building up representation, taking advantage

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DULLES CONTINUED:

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of our free elections, they try to get more and more members in the parliaments, then get into the cabinet, then get more roles in the cabinet, and then take over in that way. That was the <sup>check</sup>checkline that was followed, and there are other countries in the world, I'd rather maybe not mention too many of them, but there are other countries in the world where they are trying that same techniques. Now, in countries -- well, maybe you want to comment on that, Eric, I don't know.

SEVAREID:

No - go ahead.

DULLES:

There are other countries which do not have, cannot afford at this time, from the point of view of their developments, sophisticated what I might call parliamentary regimes. There are other countries where they use more direct techniques - that would be true in Africa, true in Southeast Asia, and other ~~countries~~ countries. There, what they try to do is to create an underground, a disaffected element, which will then permit them, as in Laos, as in Southern Viet Nam, as in other countries, to penetrate directly, not

HACK CDD, ROSSI EVEN

## DULLES CONTINUED:

using the parliamentary means of getting in, but using wars of liberation, which we've discussed before. And there are some countries that are on those countries which are on the close borders of the Soviet, are of course, in the most dangerous positions. Such as Afghanistan, Iran, Finland, has been going through some very difficult times lately, and may have more difficult times ahead.

## SEVAREDD:

Mr. Dulles, many Europeans, including Mr. Jean Monnet, think that Americans, and perhaps this government, are much too obsessed with communism and Russia, as they put it. Do you think we are? Are we neurotic on this subject?

## DULLES:

I think that is true, in a sense, and not true in another sense. I think that the one grave peril that we face is the communist peril. That is the only peril to our freedoms, to our institutions, to everything that we hold dear. Now, I think that it is true that the communists practice on us and on other countries towards which they're directing their attack, they try on us what I would call the overload theory. They will start a lot of petty annoyances in various parts of the world, without knowing whether

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DULLES CONTINUED:

they are going to seriously push them ahead, in order to divert our attention, maybe, from the major points of their attack.

BEVAREID:

How does the average distinguish between a frivolous Russian Putach and a serious one?

DULLES:

Well, I think you could add -- how does the government, itself, distinguish this. In addition to the ordinary citizen. To begin with, you can't always tell, and you can't take a minor threat as necessarily inconsequential. What's the Bible -- the Bible -- is it the Bible: "The cloud, the size of a man's hand." Isn't it? "Becomes pretty serious -- becomes a great storm."

BEVAREID:

Could you give any concrete examples of what has turned out to be minor or major?

DULLES:

Well, I think we overrated the Soviet danger, let's say, in the Congo. They went in there with fanfare. They supported Gizenga. They established a Lumumba Institute in Moscow, and it looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt at take-over in the Belgian Congo. Well, it didn't work out



WAGE CED, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

that way at all. Now, maybe they intended to do it, but they didn't find the situation right, and they beat a pretty hasty retreat. You recall, when they closed their Establishment there, the Czechs closed their Consulate, Embassy I guess it was, and they pulled out as fast as they could, and they scuttled. If we ever scuttled from a country in the way they had, the radio, the press, and the television would be full of it. That was kind of put under the rug. It did appear in the press. Now, I would say that is an instance where they started something and then decided it didn't work out.

SEVAREID:

Now about Viet Nam? Is this a serious, final kind of Push-and-pull on their part?

DULLES:

I think that is very serious. I think they look at Southeast Asia and view that as a potential major asset of the communist world if they could take it over. The great riches of Indonesia, and if you lose South Viet Nam, the problem of holding the rest of that peninsula in Southeast Asia, and the great island chain, is gravely imperiled, and therefore, I consider South Viet Nam a major importance, and not just one of the overload theory type of operations.

BLACK OUD, ROSSI EVEN

SEVAREID:

Do you think that area is more important to them than India?

DULLES:

Well, I don't think that they have any plan or project at the moment to take over India. There's quite a strong Communist Party, strong not in voting strength, but strong in organization in India. But I think that they are wise enough to realize that if they could do it, and I think they'd find it very difficult to do, but if they should take over India, just think what would they do with the four hundred million-odd people that they have -- more than four hundred million people are there. They would assume responsibility for feeding them, and agriculture has proved their very weakest point. And I doubt whether the communist world, either Chinese or Soviet, would like to take over the responsibility of feeding and caring for the four hundred million people of India. But as I say, they think that Nehru is very watchful of this, and I do not believe there's any plan or project one sees there. True, the Chinese Communists have been rather active around the frontiers of India. They've crossed the line of demarcation, the frontier lines of India in the North, and have caused great annoyance. They have not pushed their products.

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SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, when you and others talk about a Russian wish to dominate the world, what do you mean in terms of Russian national power; in terms of communism everywhere; their system everywhere, or what?

DULLES:

Well, I think that Khrushchev, in his recent speech, has outlined pretty well what is in his mind, and after all, what is in his mind is likely to become policy in the Soviet Union. He made a speech some time back, in which he outlined the period within which they would catch up with the United States, a period in which they would supposedly start their communist state. They have several facets to their policy. They believe, and some of them believe it fanatically, that communism is the wave of the future, is the form of economic life that is best adapted to push a country forward. They believe that communism will replace capitalism, <sup>as</sup> and capitalism replaced feudalism, and that as Khrushchev said, our grandchildren or our great-grandchildren would live under communism and like it. They believe, therefore, and when I say I mean the fanatical leaders of the communist regime, the members of presidium and the top echelons of the communist world,

ACK CDD, ROSSI LYEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

they believe that inevitably, through economic pressures, and the like, more and more countries will adopt communism. But they also believe that governments don't generally fall. They -- you know you get along better if you push them.

SEVAREID:

How could they dominate the world in which this country, with all its power, existed?

DULLES:

Well, they would believe, too, if they could take over enough of the rest of the world, then they could encircle us, and then, eventually, we would have to either adopt their system, or face an eventual war possibly. They don't believe that the United States is going communist in the next decade or two, anything of that kind, obviously. I do not believe that war, a hot war, a nuclear war, at any given time in the future, is a part of their plans. It is economic progress on their part, economic growth in other countries of the world, and take over through economic power, and in parts of the world, the use of the techniques of wars of liberation. (BUZZER). I think they feel that there is a strong tide in the world, today, to get the rascals out. I mean, that Latin America, no matter what the government is, there are a lot of disaffected people,

PAGE ONE, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

and where you do not have, as you do not have in many countries of the world, sort of organized party system, all of the disaffected tend to gather together under the communist banner, or led by the communists, because they're the best organized to lead a movement, get the rascals out. Now, maybe in some cases, they are rascals. In a good many cases, they're not rascals. They are just in and have power, and from the communist point of view, become the rascals. They will use these techniques.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles ---

DULLES:

Economic, industrial penetration, wars of liberation.

SEVAREID:

But to what ---

DULLES:

Use of Communist Parties; use of their front organizations of which they have a great many.

SEVAREID:

But they already seem to have too much on their plate. They can't control or direct communist states such as Yugoslavia, Albania, or China, pluralistic communism might, a great deal of it, be anti-Moscow. Might it not?

BLACK ODD, ROSSI EVAN

DULLES:

That's quite true, but difficulties at home have rarely stopped countries in foreign adventure, some times has pushed them on. I believe that the splits, the fissures, the differences between various communist countries, is today one of the greatest pre-occupations that Khrushchev has. After all, he said what he calls the Socialist world, the world becomes all Socialist, they'll all live -- lie down in peace, and live together. Well, that is what's happened, and when you see little Albania, practically throwing out the Russian representation there, both civil and military, that is really something. Why they went, hard to tell, obviously, at that time they felt that they would have to use force to stay, and they didn't want another Hungary on their hands at that moment. Hungary - in a country which was not contiguous to their own. But anyway, they got out. The Chinese thing is, obviously, very serious. Yugoslavia, back to 1948, and there was a difference in Yugoslavia that may be you even might see - most experts missed. It was really the Soviet that threw Yugoslavia out. They took the initiative, or they wrote such brutal notes to Tito that a man of any self-respect wouldn't take them. In these other cases, the initiative to move out, to move towards more independence and freedom,

OK 000, ROSEI EVER

DULLES CONTINUED:

*confused*

has come from the other countries. China has been communist. China was, obviously, in a sense that the -- Khrushchev's visit to the United States, Khrushchev's making a protest to the United States, the doctrine of co-existence, and the like, and it was they, I believe, although the experts differ on this, I rather believe it was they that did the acts that resulted in the withdrawal of the Russian technicians. Now, it may be due, first, to troubles started by the communists, and then the Russians said: "Well, if you don't change this, we'll take them out," and then they went out.

SEVAREID:

But in any case, Mr. Dulles, we're not likely to see a world run from one central switchboard, whether in Moscow or Peking, or Washington, or anywhere else. Are we?

DULLES:

(LAUGHTER). No, I don't -- I don't think anything like that, because I think we're going to win this. I think if we stay united, we're going to win this. I'm not a -- I'm not a pessimist. (BUZZER). For the last ten years, I think, beginning with the Truman doctrine, now I want to pay a tribute to what Truman did in Greece and Korea to stop the communists.



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DULLES CONTINUED:

Beginning then and working through the Eisenhower administration, and what President Eisenhower did, what my brother did, and all those around him, to hold the line, and what President Kennedy is doing today, I think if we can keep the free world united, I don't -- I don't really worry as to the ultimate outcome. The only thing I worry about is, are we going to be adequately united in this? I think I mentioned before, that what did my generation see happening. Saw the Western world tear itself to pieces in two fratricidal wars and build up communism. Now, we're going to do more of that, They're going to win. If we're going to stand together, they're going to lose.

SEVAREID:

When you say "we're going to win" this struggle with Russia, how far do you take that -- to the collapse of the communist system inside Russia, or merely the protection of areas vital to us, in the gradual withdrawal of this thing?

DULLES:

Well, I take it to be a gradual evolution. I don't look forward to revolution in the -- in the communist world. A new generation is coming on in Russia. In the old days, before I -- not so long ago, before I left the Agency, and I don't think I'm betraying

DULLES CONTINUED:

any secrets here, we used to see a great many reports of the unrest among the -- among the youth. Now, I don't say that they weren't loyal to the government. The government, because of what it's done, the regime and Khrushchev, has a great hold on the people, but in certain fields, in the field of literature, in the field of art/. I heard the other day that their little private bootleg showings of modern pieces of modern art, that a group will get together, and one or two of them will make modern painting that are not really allowed - they're not approved - they're not liked by the regime.

SEVARENID:

But what does that signify in terms of changing their system, or their thrust overseas by its various means?

DULLIZI:

Well, I believe that if you could get a regime that was responsive to the Russian people, then you might have an entire change in the outlook and attitude of Russia towards the rest of the world. And in my --- writings and in my talks that I gave, I would distinguish between Russia and the Russian people, and the Soviet and the Communist leaders. I think that is the difference.

FACE CARD, ROSSI EVEN

SEVAREID:

That (?)  
What was the church militant with communism  
becoming the established church. Isn't it?

DULLES:

That's right.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, when Khrushchev was here, did you  
get a chance to talk with him at all?

DULLES:

Yes. I didn't have a long talk with him, but I had  
a very, quite amusing encounter with him. It took  
place at -- at the dinner that President Eisenhower  
gave for Khrushchev and his party, and it was at  
the White House, and as the guests there it was quite  
a large dinner, around a hundred, I should think --  
something of that kind. And we went -- we were  
presented to the guest of honor, and we went along  
in line, and Clover was with me, and the President  
was here, and right next to him was Khrushchev, and  
then Mrs. Eisenhower and Madame Kuchavaya, and President  
introduced me and said, "This is Mr. Dulles. You  
may know Mr. Dulles." He turned to his reporters  
with kind of a twinkle in his eye, because he's got  
a cute -- you must admit he's got a good sense  
of humor, and he said, "Oh, yes, I know you. I read  
your reports." Well, yes, I didn't -- as you go along

WICK END, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED;

the line, you can't stop and argue with a fellow, whether he's the head of a Russian state, or whoever it may be. So, I just went on, because that's no time for a conversation, because you hold up all the rest of the line. After dinner, we were in the room where the men gathered there, next to the dining room, in the White House, and we were having coffee and cigars, and we were standing around, and Dick Nixon -- Vice-President Nixon came up to me and said: "Have you talked with Khrushchev?" And I said, "Well, I just talked to him as I went by the line." He said, "Oh, come on up." Well, I said, "No, I don't want to butt in there." There were a lot of Senatorial leaders, the Senate and the House were around him, and so forth and so on. He said, "Oh, come along." So he took me up and he said, "Prime Minister, have you met Mr. Dulles?" "Oh yes, I've met him," he said to his interpreter, according to the interpreter, "As I told him, I read his reports." And well then, I had a chance to answer, and I said, "I hope you get them legally." And, "Oh, he said, 'you know, you know how we get them. We all pay the same agents and we all got the same reports.' Well," I said, "that's kind of sharing the wealth, isn't it?" And then we had a laugh and that ended it.

WACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

Well, that's about what took place. I've got a memorandum in the office. I don't know exactly the wording, but that's about the way it ...

SEVAREID:

Did he mean your public or your private reports?

DULLES:

Ah, he never told me.

SEVAREID:

BUT he was ...

DULLES:

I think he had in mind that he read agents' reports.

SEVAREID:

Do you think it's possible that he has?

DULLES:

Every once in a while somebody gets caught, but that game goes both ways.

SEVAREID:

Was that the end of the conversation?

DULLES:

That was the end of the conversation and the last conversation. One of the -- a man who doubled in the very -- one of the very able newsmen who doubled in another capacity and then heard the conversation, and I was quite amused. I didn't even tell my wife this, which I should have done, and the next morning,

WACK CUD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

on CBS, I heard this story on CBS the next morning, on the radio. It was pretty good. It wasn't your man that overheard it though - it was somebody else. (LAUGHTER). But it was no reason - it was a harmless story and a good story.

SEVAREID:

Are you giving the impression that the White House and the CIA are very insecure?

DULLES:

What I said to him -- there were half a dozen people that heard what I said to him.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, in view of what you've said about -- your optimism about the future in this world conflict ...

DULLES:

A conditioned optimism ~~is~~ conditioned on what we do. Eric, I want to always bring that out.

SEVAREID:

Well, why then are people like Senator Goldwater criticized when they say that we ought to state, as a matter of national policy, that we are going to win this Cold War?

DULLES:

Well, hasn't the President said that? Hasn't Eisenhower said that? Hasn't Truman said that?

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BLACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES

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That the policy, irrespective of party --  
party affiliations? It always was.

SEVAREID:

I don't think it's been so phrased in recent months  
or years, anyway.

DULLES:

I don't think there ought to be any doubt on that  
~~question~~ question. If you start out with a doubt on that  
question, you've lost the war before you begin it.

SEVAREID:

Well, wouldn't it help if there were a  
plain, flat assurance to people, that  
we are going to come out on top in this?

DULLES:

Well, I never had any doubt that that was the  
policy of the three recent administrations  
under which I have served.

SEVAREID:

Do you think that Mr. Khrushchev is in a hurry  
to accomplish a great deal in his lifetime?

DULLES:

No, I don't think he's in a hurry in a sense  
that, let's say, Hitler was. You recall those  
reports that were found after the war, of his  
talks with his leaders and his generals, just before



WICK ODD, ROSSI KYLE

DULLES;

he went into war and attacked the Poland, and when he looked around the world and saw what the obstacles were, and then said, "I'm fifty," <sup>or</sup> words to this effect - "I've got to accomplish these objectives in my lifetime. I can't wait. I must do it now. I must do it now when I have all my vigor," so forth and so on, and "I must get this accomplished." I don't remember his exact words, but it's in the ~~appendix~~ record. Khrushchev has never indicated that he was a man with that kind of a timetable. In fact, again I mention this timetable - he sets himself ten years to reach our level and twenty years to get communism really going, and he must realize that he, himself, is not going to live that long, it would seem most unlikely. One could speculate how many years of power he has. Khrushchev's I think, sixty-eight. He's led a very tough life, so they must realize that he has a limited number of years in which he can continue to exercise the power he's now exercising. So I would think that what Khrushchev, and this is assuming that there is no tragedy in the meantime, has nothing that sets off a nuclear war, and I don't see anything of that kind around the corner, I would assume that Khrushchev

KACH (XU), ROSSI KUTH

## DULLES CONTINUED:


would hope that in the next five years, or during his period of power, would have greatly narrowed the gap in economic, industrial production vis-a-vis the United States. Under his timetable, he won't have caught us, but he could narrow that gap. I think he might expect that he would have made considerable progress in other countries, a few specified countries. Now, undoubtedly, he looks at countries such as those in Southeast Asia, I've mentioned, Laos and Southern Viet Nam, pressures are on in Afghanistan and Finland, and a few other countries. I think he would hope to leave a -- a broadened cushion around the Soviet homeland, plus an assured economy and a continuous growing economy. I can't see what more he could hope for in his lifetime, but that's crystal-gazing again.

## SEVAREID:

Are't his aims in a situation like the Berlin Germany problem -- are they of limited nature for the national security of Russia and its boundaries? Are they unlimited?

## DULLES:

his  
I think that <sup>his</sup> territorial -- his immediate territorial aims are of unlimited character.



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BLACK ODD, ROSEY SVEN

DULLES CONTINUING:

I think that the goal that he set, the ultimate goal for the Russian---for the Soviet---for the U. S. S. R. that he hopes to leave, that the ultimate goal of the U. S. S. R. are unlimited, but he doesn't expect, I wouldn't think, to reach these limitless goals in his lifetime.

SEVARKID:

What does he want in Berlin? He wants us out of there does he? (BUZZER.)

DULLES:

Yes, he wants us out of there. We're a great nuisance. It's a---I say we---the West Berliners are a great nuisance. They're right there in the middle of this area that <sup>is</sup> ~~has~~ already disaffected as far as communism concerned---the puppet regime of Wilbright and he wants us out of there and further, following along on this "overload" theory, here is the area he can put on more overload than on anywhere else. We're extended out there at the end of a long line. <sup>we</sup> ~~They~~ have the question of communications. <sup>we</sup> ~~They~~ have the question of maintain

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WACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUING:

forces in Germany, forces in Berlin and by keeping the German issue hot, he can put more pressure on us at less cost to himself than almost anywhere else in the world.

SEVAREID:

But he---you don't feel that he's willing to settle there simply for our recognition of East Germany and so on and isn't all of Germany in his mind and the direction German future policy takes on his mind?

DULLES:

I don't think he wants to settle or it is worth while for him to settle from his point of view unless he can get a complete victory. I think he gets more mileage out of having this as a constant point of attack than he would have out of any---what might seem a compromise settlement, if there is one. I don't know that there is one.

SEVAREID:

But you don't think we should take any steps toward making compromises, or concessions?

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DULLES:

I don't. No. I think this is an issue on which our--  
where our rights are clear. Our responsibilities are  
clear. I think we ought to stand on our position.

SEVAREID:

But then it means constant needling from Khrushchev,  
doesn't it?

DULLES:

That's right.

SEVAREID:

And constant dangers?

DULLES:

That's right and maybe that goes back a little bit to  
what John Monnet said. "We must just expect these,  
beat them, but not go into any kind of a tailspin, or  
get terrible excited when we have the kind of irritation  
what we must expect as long as we are there." <sup>SEVAREID:</sup> You don't  
have any serious (BUZZER) fears of a big war over  
Berlin, then?

DULLES:

Well, I don't feel that the Soviet Union wants a big

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WACK OED, ROSSI EWTEN

DULLER CONTINUES:

war over anything unless it's prestige and it's power position, <sup>as</sup> with so gravely endangered that it saw no other way out and I don't think that's the case in Berlin or elsewhere in the world today.

SEVAREID:

Would there be great danger of war, if Russian power in East Europe particularly, began to recede---movement against them are getting stronger in East Germany and Hungary, Czechoslovakia and so on? What would they then do?

DULLER:

You mean if---if the free world began to succeed at a rapid pace?

SEVAREID:

Yes---

DULLER:

---where would that place end? The graymen of your question is that maybe we'd better not succeed too fast.  
(Laughter.)

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REAL

WACK OED, ROSSI EVEN

SEVAREID:

Well, I just wondered what---what the reaction would be

DULLES:

It's hard to tell. I hope that wouldn't put---that thought wouldn't put ideas in our mind that we should slacken in any way to border---to increase the border freedom. As I say, looking ahead. I would hope that any such successes would be concomitant with this evolution in the Soviet Union, so they would be viewed as successes directed against the vital position of Moscow

We don't want---the United States---none of the free countries wants to do anything that would affect the frontiers---the position of Russia as it has existed over the years.

SEVAREID:

But we used to talk about liberation, or containment the general way. Now we don't talk about liberation more. We talk about containment or some people say "piecemeal compromises," which may be surrender. If they really won that argument in effect?



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HACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES:

Well, I hope that we haven't fully adopted the---the theory merely of containment. I'm a great friend of George (Kennan?)'s. I've just been reading his admirable book on the Soviet under Lenin and Stalin and so forth. I---I don't think one should adopt any such static policy, but obviously faced with an antagonist like the Soviet Union, that's pushing her, there and the other place and you have to practice at a given point and in given areas the tactics of containment, without necessarily adopting the over-all thesis that containment of Russia with its continued dominance in the European satellites, in North Vietnam, together with communist China and in other areas, is accepted.

SEVAREID:

A great many people in this country are impatient because they say we ought to get on the initiative or on the offensive in this cold war. Can this be done and if so, how?

DULLES:

If I could answer that, I would deserve the Nobel Peace

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DULLES CONTINUING:

Prise (laughter). I don't know---I think that in the field of ideas, there is a good deal that can be done and I believe that your old colleague Ed Murrow is doing an admirable job where he now is as head of U. S. I. n. and is quick to explore these avenues. Feel that every thing we can do to let the Soviet people know what the United States is like---what the free countries are like, is of vital importance. I wish there could be more Russian students over here, more of the youth over here and give them complete freedom to go anywhere except inside an atomic installation and one or two different areas. We have only created these so-called restricted areas because the Soviet has. I assume that we'd be glad to get rid of them if the Soviet would do the same. There's no indication that they will, but I believe that a human being inherently strives for freedom. I think that's the whole history of civilization and the Soviet people are going to strive for freedom. They are not satisfied now. They're not satisfied because they can't paint as they want, because they can't

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**DULLES CONTINUES:**

create music as they want, because they can't read as they want, because they can't know about history as they want and they're beginning to realize now that they don't know these things and that they can't do these things. Over the period of time, the more we can do to see that Russia is opened up to the world---the more we can do along that line, the better it's going to be. Now, it's not easy, because they're sensitive to that. The Soviet is sensitive to that. Why aren't your television programs allowed in the Soviet Union? Why don't our great dailies get sold in the Soviet Union? There are numbers of the edition of "America" that are printed under U. S. I. A. that are printed under this exchange program. As far as I understand, they are bought up as rapidly and passed all around and they could sell ten times as many.

**SEVAREID:**

Well, Mr. Dulles, even on the question of imperialism the world, the communist bloc seems to have a constant initiative and always be on the offensive on this, yet

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MACK GDD, ROSSI EVEN

SEVAREID CONTINUING:

there is a greater imperialism by far now remaining. Why can't we take a propaganda offensive, at least on that point, in the U. N., for example?

DULLES:

Well, I think we should. I think an effort has been made to do that and in this whole propaganda area, you must remember that they have complete freedom to inundate the free world with all of their propaganda, whether by and large, the information that we send to the Soviet Union by air, or by other means, is---is mostly intercepted or---or is jammed, so that they have a---a perfectly free area in which to operate and we have to operate into a closed area.

SEVAREID:

But in neutral and smaller countries, we have as much right to operate on this question.

DULLES:

That is correct, but do you think in---take in Europe countries---I don't think on this issue---they make much headway, because they know of the Soviet imperia

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WICK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUING:

in the satellite areas and the Soviet imperialism has exercised over their own ethnic groups. Now, I grant you, when you get to Africa and Southeast Asia, that story is not known and I think there are a great many countries where it ought to be sold, more than it is.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, what do the Russians want in terms of Cuba? How do they look at Cuba? Just as a base to distract us, or what?

DULLES:

No, I think they find in Cuba an extraordinary, useful base---well, let me say, they did find it (inaudible) extraordinary useful base from which to penetrate with personnel and with ideas and programs, the other countries of South America. I use the word "did" just because I think that what is happening in Cuba is sort of blotting their copy book a good bit. In the past they have had areas from which---in the continent, from which they have operated and they did have, for a time quite a large establishment in Cuba itself, because

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EXL

ACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUING:

days of Castro and they used that and their other Latin-American countries where they have embassies and where they have travel agencies and cultural agencies and so forth. Cuba now is by far the best. One of the interesting things that happens to Cuba is they can use Cuba as a base for sending people to any part of the Soviet Union for training without anybody knowing about it, because you see, they go on a trip to Cuba and then they get on a Soviet plane, or Czech plane, and then they disappear.

SEVARIED:

Is this Latin American---

DULLES:

Oh, no, these are going the other way now---Latin Americans, yes---Latin Americans. Students, technicians, pilots to be trained in the use of jet aircraft. So far that has been restricted mostly to Cubans, but a good many others and it would go, I believe into many hundreds of other eventual agents for use in Latin America, have been secretly exfiltrated from Latin American countries

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PEEL

WACK OLD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUING:

to Cuba. They go perfectly openly to Cuba and then off they go and nobody knows. There's no visa record in an out and they disappear behind the iron curtain, get their train~~ing~~ and then come back the same way and that is just one of the techniques they can use in Latin America.

SEVAREID:

I had been told that after the Spanish War, the Russian took a great many young Spanish people---children, raise them in Russia---that many of them are now showing up in Latin America, speaking Spanish of course, Russian-trained, going up with Cuban passports. Have you any evidence of this?

DULLES:

I hadn't heard of that particular technique, but it is extremely likely. They did take a great number of Spaniards when they went back after the Spanish Civil War and some of them they've sent back to---to Spain, but it would be most likely---I think your story is most likely, because they would have had available other



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RETEL

WACK CDD, ROSSI EVEN

**DULLES CONTINUING:**

to send via Cuba to Latin America and the road that I have traced out of Latin America through Cuba the communist world obviously is the two-way street and you can send people from the Soviet Union into Cuba and thence into Latin America without arousing any great publicity or knowledge of where they come from.

**SEVAREID:**

Mr. Dulles, you're no longer in the government and perhaps can speak a little more freely. What do you think we ought to do about Cuba now, if anything?

**DULLES:**

I was brought up so long, you know, as being in government, in the days where I always said when asked a question of this kind, "This is a policy question. Go to the Secretary of State or the President on that." I don't know that I can add out of any particular knowledge that I have---any worthwhile suggestions on action to be taken with regard to Cuba. I think that the economic sanction has probably aggravated this situation within Cuba, but economic sanctions are very, very slow. You

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WACH OED, ROSSI EVEN

**DULLES CONTINUING:**

may recall in---it wasn't a case of economic sanctions, but was a case of economic problems, when---back in Iran in the days when Mossadegh was in and when - - - - - oil revenues---he cancelled out the oil concession and oil revenues stopped for quite a long while. Well, a lot of people said, "Oh, Iran can't stand that. They can't get along." Well, they did get along under Mossadegh. Eventually it helped to result in Mossadegh withdrawal. I think probably these economic sanctions might help to bring about a change in Cuba, but I would rather leave this to those who have more immediate information on the subject than I and maybe I wouldn't be considered the wisest person to give advice on Cuba. I don't know about that. Some people at least might think that, so I think I'll keep off the subject.

**BEVAREID:**

Well, Mr. Dulles, if you can, would you tell us, in regard (BUZZER) to the Cuban affair last spring where you think the central mistake was.

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REEL.

MACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES:

Eric, I've consistently taken the position that I would not discuss the Cuban operation. The President has said that he assumed responsibility for the action taken. That was his own initiative. In matters of that kind, where they wish the director of the Central Intelligence Agency to assume responsibility, he's always prepared to do it and I have never discussed the Cuban operation. I think I'd rather limit my remarks to pointing out that there were certain factors which bore upon the timing of any operation if it was carried out, namely, that we knew that Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia, that MIG's were in crates in large numbers in Cuba and that if those trained pilots got back and these MIG's became operative, the possibility of any invasion by a Cuban force, or even by an American force, would be greatly---the dangers and the problems would be greatly increased. That was merely a question of timing, but I have never discussed the operation itself and I think probably it's wiser for me to maintain that position, even as a private citizen. I had to meet

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REEL

FACE ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUING:

quietly a lot of attacks. I've done that over years and I think no man ought to go into government, or go out of government without expecting to be the subject of attacks, some of which are unjust, but that's the thing you've just got to take. Otherwise, you'd better stay in private business, <sup>where</sup> or you may get different kinds of attacks.

SEYARHEID:

Well, people who try to form judgments, newspaper people, radio people, T. V. people, generally---they cannot form it very well without some answer to some of the charges that have been made. Now, there is one point on the Cuba affair where I would think and hope at least that you could make response as an individual American and that is the argument that the philosophical and legal argument that this whole affair was both immoral and illegal. Can you respond that that, Mr. Dulles?

DULLES:

Well, I think I'd respond to that by asking you a question. Here, you had a group of fine young men---these

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REEL

WACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

**DULLES CONTINUING:**

Cubans---formed the brigade that went into Cuba, who asked nothing other than the opportunity to try to restore a free government in their country, who were ready to risk their lives and have done so, whether they should have been told that they would get no sympathy, no support, no aid from the United States. That's the question---I just pose that question. I don't ask you to answer it, but I'll answer your question with another question.

**SEVAREID:**

But, doesn't all this raise a rather profound question for this country, given its traditions and given the kind of war it has to meet all around the world? For example, the matter of treaty commitments in this hemisphere, whereby we are bound not to intervene in the affairs of other countries. Isn't this a little like the domestic question where we give free rights to communists who would like to use them, to subvert them. How do we prevent intervention on this hemisphere by others? We are not bound by those commitments.

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HACK COPY, ROSSI KEVIN

## TITLES:

That, I think---is a question one should face up to and one should answer and that is not only applicable in this hemisphere, it's applicable in many parts of the world. That's applicable---maybe in a slightly different legal sense, but it's applicable also in Southeast Asia. It is applicable in---in Africa and other countries. Here, we face communism, Soviet Union abetted in the foreign field by China here and there, because they have their domestic problems and their ideological disputes, but they will have some problems abroad, but we must take them as a---as a cooperating partnership insofar as the foreign areas are concerned, quite largely subject to the fact they may have disputes before they divide up the partnership assets, or the partnership responsibilities, if you follow what I mean. Anyway, this aggregate of the communist world---they have this apparatus. They have their parties, particularly the Soviet Union ..... of them around the world and---well, there are more than eight-one, but eight-one of them were represented at the last Party

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WICK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

**DULLES CONTINUING:**

Congress last October, including the American Communist Party and there they had an insidious element inside of eighty-odd countries financed in most cases, supported action directed by a foreign power, against the country where they are organized. Now, we have nothing comparable to that. It would be contrary to our whole theory. You couldn't have a sort of a freedom brigade, or a freedom party, that was supported by whom---it wouldn't be Washington, or London---would it be the N. A. T. O. powers? Anyway, you haven't got it---haven't got it today and we're at a terrible disadvantage, because of these parties and they have with them all of their front organizations, or representatives of them. The World Federation of Trade Unions, which you know is communist-dominated. The Soviet Union tolerates no labor unions. You can't strike in the Soviet Union. You can't organize in the Soviet Union, but they have externally the---this very strong labor movement. It is the strongest single labor movement in France. It is dominated by the W. F. T. U. And Italy, is dominated by the W. F. T. U.



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0022.

MARKS CASE, ROSSI RIVEN

**DOLLARS CONTINUING:**

It is represented strongly in the other countries of Europe. Strongly in Indonesia, strongly in Japan, India and other countries. That's just one of the assets that the communist apparatus has. The communist ---local Communist Party has and they have the world peace movement. They have all sorts of youth organizations. They're going to stage this great youth organization in Finland. Why are they doing it in Finland? Well, it's part of their campaign against Finland. They tried it in Vienna and they got a bloody nose with it in Vienna, because the Viennese didn't like any part of it. I'm talking now about the---this great youth festival that they have every couple of years, so that you have these communist parties, insidiously operating in each country, with these front organizations to back them up with financing from Moscow and there is, in the world, nothing comparable to meet that. Now, in the United States, for various reasons, we've got this pretty well under control and there are certain legal steps being taken now, as you know. That's true in many of the

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BACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUING:

other countries of the world, but there are a lot of countries where it is not true and it's still dangerous in some of the European countries. The communists are very strong in Italy, as you know, one of the strongest of the party.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, they encourage the "better red than dead" state of mind in West Europe and over here to some degree. Have you seen any evidence in the communist-bloc countries, of a "better red, white and blue than dead" movement?

DULLES:

(Laughter.) By the communist countries, you mean the satellites and the Soviet Union itself and---

SEVAREID:

Yes.

DULLES:

Well, you do see, in these countries, here and there as I said before, groups that are groping for new and better things, that want more freedom.

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FAIR

BACK ON, ROSSI EVEN

SEVAREID:

You don't see pacifist movements, do you?

DOLLER:

No, you don't see pacifist movements, although I think the Soviet people, from all I've heard, from all the tourists, the one thing they fear is war. I think, except for the fact that a pacifist movement's gotten a bad name, I think---by a pacifist movement you mean abhorrence of war, I think it's pretty universal.

SEVAREID:

A state of wishing no war---

DOLLER:

But that doesn't mean---the pacifist movement means not only are you against war, but you're against defense against war and that's where the pacifist movement becomes so dangerous. I've seen no evidence in the Soviet Union, or heard---seen no reports indicating that there had been any strikes, or sit-downs, or any missile factories, or bomber factories, or anything of that kind. You don't have anything of that sort.

*Confusing*

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REEL

HACK ONE, ROSSI EVEN

SEVARKID:

Mr. Dulles, aren't we, when you come right down to it, in this country, aren't we involved in a considerable moral dilemma in terms of our traditions and our commitments, that a state of mind in one country which says in effect, "We shall do nothing immoral, even though it may lead to a defeat" and the other side says, "Anything is moral as long as it may lead to a victory"? Isn't that other side with that state of mind apt to win a great many rounds?

DULLES:

You mean the—the latter side going to win?

SEVARKID:

The side for which any move is moral, if it leads to a gain. How do we adjust to this?

DULLES:

Well, that, I assume you would say is the Soviet philosophy, but I think maybe instead of the word "moral," you'd put "is what is good or desirable." They certainly view any move as desirable which over all weakens the free world. You've hit, there, a point

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WEL

PAGE TWO, ROSSI EVEN

**DULLES CONTINUING:**

that's very difficult to answer in a---in a word. I don't think it is immoral---is immoral for us, or for anybody to use covert methods to defeat the attempt of Soviet Union to subvert a free government, or a free country. Now, I'm not going into all the techniques you use and there are a great many attacks that have been made---made there, but to---to build up a resistance in a free country, by, let's say, training their---their police force, or by giving them certain types of weapons to meet communist attempts to riot and in other ways. Would you think it was immoral to send some tear gas down to prevent the communists staging a riot in a country which might result in the overthrow of that government? No, I wouldn't.

**SEVAREID:**

Now about the question about waging, at least in part, an undeclared war in Vietnam, as we seem to be doing today? Aren't we forced to these measures---this flexibility, regardless sometimes of our law or our sense of violence?

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JACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES:

Yes, and this war is being waged on--on South Vietnamese territory, which has been invaded as it were and in some cases actually invaded by people from the hostile north. What I understand happened in part was they have sent back to Southern Vietnam with military equipment and with military formations, a good many of the people that when they had the great exchange of populations, went from south to north. Now, the number that went from the communist area in the north to the south was ten or twenty times the number that went the other way, but still there were quite a number whose homes were in the south, two thousand <sup>WHOSE</sup> ~~thousand~~ homes were in the south, who went north. They're now being sent back. With others added to them.

SEVARKID:

Well, speaking as a lawyer, are we at war in Southeast Asia?

DULLES:

Oh, no. Oh, no. We're not at war.

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REEM.

HACK QED, HOSSI EVEN

SEVAREID:

How do you describe our operation?

DALLIES:

Well, we are aiding a friendly country at their request, to build up their forces to defeat a covert invasion of their country. Now, if we joined in an attack on North Vietnam, or on any other country, then your question might arise, but at the present time, this is an invasion of South Vietnam. Covert, it is true. Secret, it is true, but nonetheless dangerous.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dallas, I'd like to switch around, if I can, to some matters that concern the C. I. A.---

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dallas, I wouldn't be performing my duties and functions here properly, if I didn't still ask you one or two more specific questions about Cuba. Is it true, as charged, that we failed to inform the Cuban underground in Cuba, of the time and place of that landing attempt?



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REEL

WACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES:

Eric, we didn't inform them. As I recall, we informed very few people when we started the invasion of France in June of '44. You can't (BUZZER) do that. We did not inform the Cuban underground of the time and place of the invasion. To do so would have been informing Castro and it would have been catastrophe for the invading forces.

SEVAREID:

Would it have been more of a catastrophe? Wouldn't they have been able to have been some assistance?

DULLES:

Not unless they had been notified long before, which is obviously impossible and I doubt even so then, because then Castro would have been able to block all the lines of approach--roads of approach to the invasion area.

SEVAREID:

We did achieve some element of surprise, did we?

DULLES:

Complete surprise was achieved as regards the place of landing.

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REMI.

MACK GDD, ROSSI EVEN

SHVAREID:

But not timing, because that was published---

DULLES:

No, they did not know the exact timing. They had been crying invasion for weeks and months before and as you note, they're even now crying that invasions are being planned.

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REEL

KACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

SEVAKID:

It's been said in one of these books about the C.I.A., Mr. Dulles, that the C.I.A. people refused to put into effect the Presidential order to keep out all former Batista supporters from that expedition. What is the truth of that?

DULLES:

Well, it's not true at all Eric. It was an absolute rule that no Batistianos were to be accepted. Now, when the friendly Cubans who were doing the recruiting, that is ---because Cubans had to do that and we---those Cubans who did the recruiting were men of the highest caliber as far as we could tell and also were men who were entirely hostile to Batista. They were under the strictest injunctions that no one who was a partisan of Batista in any way, shape, or manner, should be allowed in the group of recruits. Now, it is true that some of those who were recruited had served in the Cuban Army. After all, you are looking for soldiers and if a man had had some prior military training, he would be the type that the Cuban selectors would naturally have turned to and

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REEL

HACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

some of them had served in the army when Batista was in power, but after all, Batista got very little help from the army. One of the reasons for his complete and total and quick collapse was because the army deserted him and also any of those taken from the Army were from the lower echelons. Lieutenants, not higher-- high officers in the army under Batista, but those who had any favors from Batista, but merely those, who as young men, were serving their country just as the inductees and recruits we have in our army.

SEWARD:

I thought that Castro had found and in fact, executed several people who had been high in Batista's favor, from the expedition?

DULLES:

There was one man who was pointed out particularly by Castro as a Batista, who infiltrated the brigade without anybody's knowledge. He was a member of the crew of one of the merchant ships and these Cuban merchant ships had quite a number--mostly Cubans in

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WASH DC, 20051 NVHS

DULLES CONTINUED:

their crew. There was one man who was a Batistaite who jumped ship and without [our knowledge, without] the knowledge of those---the Cuban leaders of the brigade, joined the brigade on the shore. Now, there may have been, in fifteen hundred people---there's always a possibility you make one or two mistakes, a few mistakes, but nobody was knowingly selected by the Cuban selectors of the members of the brigade <sup>who</sup> <sup>id</sup> in favor of Batista.

SEVAREID:

That is, the theory that C.I.A. people were so anxious to have anti-Communists that they didn't bother much about their previous record---

DULLES:

We bothered a great deal on that and the general guidelines that we'd been given were strictly followed.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, after the Cuban affair, there were predictions and requests indeed, that in the C.I.A. intelligence and operations be separated. What has happened in that area?

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AGE 000, ROSSI EVEN

DULLKS:

Well, there Eric, you're getting into realms with regard to the C.I.A. that even as a graduate I don't discuss in any detail. There was, as you recall--- there was a committee set up by the President and General Max Taylor, with Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, Arleigh Burke and myself, to look into all phases of the operation. We met over many weeks. We made to General Taylor a series of reports, many of them oral, to the President. All of this has been reported in the <sup>press</sup> and there has been also a report that I won't deny that the conclusion was reached and it was unanimous, that this operation took on a character that--particularly in its latter phases, which exceeded the scope of the normal activities of the C.I.A. and I agreed with that-- I agreed with that.

SEVAREID:

You think the C.I.A. got too deeply into this affair?

WILLIAMS:

Well, I feel that operations of the C.I.A. should be of a character if they get into operations and that is up

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DEEL.

HACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

to the Executive---if they get into operations. These operations should be of a nature that could be kept quiet and be of the concealed type.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, a somewhat personal question if I may. You're known in this city as a prodigious worker and so was your brother, the late Secretary of State and it was often said of him, "That he carried the State Department under his own hat." and I think on Commission several years ago said that they thought you had taken on too many duties in the C.I.A. Is that correct?

DULLES:

Which is correct, number one, or number two? Let's see.

SEVAREID:

Did not the Hoover Commission several years ago say you had taken on too much yourself?

DULLES:

Yes, I think there was such a report, but I think there was a slight misunderstanding which I tried later to clear. Under the law, the Director of Central Intelligence is



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REEL

BACK GND, ROESI EVEN

EXCERPTS CONTINUED:

responsible for all of the activities of the agency, just as the Secretary of Defense is responsible for all the activities of the Defense Department and the Secretary of State of the State Department, so I was responsible for such duties as under law, or under a directive of the National Security Council was assigned to me. Now, the idea that I tried to run all those things by myself. That is a false idea. I had an organization which I think was a good organization. I delegated a very large measure of responsibility and I've also been accused of delegating too much responsibility in the-- in the Cuban matter, so that I don't think the charge was a correct one. I believe in working hard. I believe in trying to keep on top of all the activities of the agency in the sense of knowing what is going on and convincing myself that the man who is in immediate charge of the operation is competent, doing a competent job. I think that's good management and I tried to carry out those rules, but I delegated very widely to my subordinates and I had a group of subordinates of

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DEEL

BACK 000, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

when I was really proud. I think I had a right to be proud of them, but you've asked one---you inserted a double question there on me---[LAUGHTER]

SEVERETT:

I did and if I may refer in another way to that. On one of these very programs about a year ago, Mr. Walter Lippmann made this statement, "that Secretary of State Dulles paid very little attention to the State Department as such," because, said Mr. Lippmann, "he had his own foreign service, namely, his brother's intelligence operation." What would be your reaction to that?

DULLES:

Well, I don't know---I know you're a very accurate <sup>man</sup> quoter of letters, but I---I wouldn't agree with that. I rarely know a man, who, before reaching an important decision consulted more fully than he did. I used to participate in a great many of the meetings he had, particularly on Saturday morning. He would generally do his work in his house on Saturday and on Saturday mornings---and I wasn't always there by any means, but

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BLACK ONIA, ROSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

I was there a good many of these meetings. He would get together eight or ten of his top people and go over in detail the---the particular problems that were up, whether it were Suez, or the Eisenhower Doctrine in regard to the Middle East, the off-shore islands---the debates we had over those were numerous and in those meetings, everybody spoke their views with vigor and he liked to have around him men that weren't "yes men". He had no use for "yes men".

SEWARD:

Well, a feeling had grown up in this city among many people, perhaps uninformed people, that he was not very keen to take advice from his subordinates. You're saying the opposite?

DULLES:

I'm saying the opposite. I believe the opposite. I'm sure I'm right on it.

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SEWARD:

Mr. Dulles, former Vice President Nixon says in his book

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WACK 000, ROSSI 0000

SEVARELS CONTINUED:

"That right after meeting Castro here, in April of '59, he felt and so advised C.I.A., State Department and Whitehouse, that Castro was either very naive, or under Communist discipline and that this must be very carefully watched." Was he ahead of others? What was your own feeling and the feeling in your agency at that time?

DULLES:

Well, I think that Mr. Nixon was one of the first to realize that Castro was a danger and he talked with me about that a good many times. I think we were all disturbed about Castro from a very early date, particularly disturbed because of his irresponsibility. Naturally, we studied the background of the man. He was supposed to have been and probably was at the E..... You recall the time---when in Columbia, George Marshall was down there and there was a very serious riot, promulgated probably by the Communists. He was in that to some extent, according to all reports. He---I believe was a lawyer, I regret to say---

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SECRET

BLACK ODD, ROSSZ ZVBN

SEVAREID:

Not a very---

DULLES:

---and came of a family that did not indicate any Communist sympathies. However, his early life, I think, should have put us on notice, at least that we were faced and I believe we realized this, with a very irresponsible man who would seek to gain power through use of those individuals, movements---whatever they might be, which would strengthen his position, including Communism. We must remember however, that at the time he came in, he had the overwhelming support of the Cuban people, including a great many people who could not be accused of having any Communist affiliations. Most of these people are now in this country and in exile in various other places. It's always difficult to have a better judgment of a particular leader in a foreign country than the respected individuals in that own---in that country. Maybe we were slow about it. Certainly we got disturbed about Castro at a fairly early date, but what were you going to do about it? Castro was in

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REEL

BLACK ODD, ROSSI EVER

DULLES CONTINUED:

there, with the great support of the majority of the people and if we had planned any expedition at an earlier date, that might not have been of any more success than the one that we did after rather mature preparations.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, on this whole question of how we deal with Communists and Communist tactics around the world---suppose the line of---you might call passive defense were followed---that those who say we must not test, we must never do things like this attempt on Cuba, or fight in an undeclared way in Vietnam---those [REDACTED] who think by moral example we are going to be stronger and more effective. What would be the outcome?

DULLES:

Disaster. I don't think you can meet this form of evil by merely passive resistance. You recall well the days of the thirties? What happened when Hitler first denounced the Treaty of Versailles? Withdraw from the disarmament conference? Invaded the Rhineland? Took over Austria? Invaded Czechoslovakia? A lot of checks

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REHL

MACK OBR, MOSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

1 always  
were turned to Hitler then and look what happened---almost  
happened to the world? Do we want to repeat that sort  
of thing again? I don't think we do. I think you must  
meet aggression, open or covert and you must meet it  
where it appears, whether in Berlin or Laos. Now, I  
don't mean that you have to meet aggression by sending  
American troops and by armed force and so forth. There  
are many other ways, because they are not acting through  
the use of open military forces of the Soviet Union and  
Communist China at this time.

SEVAREIN:

Mr. Dulles, we are trying to meet this thing, particularly  
in the realm of heavy armament. We all fear war. Is  
there no way to get beyond this balance of power technique  
for keeping the peace? Is there no way to make a break  
in this disarmament stalemate?

DULLES:

I worked on the disarmament issue for many years. Eric,  
beginning in 1925, I tended the conference on .....  
to restrict the traffic in arms and then '26, in Geneva



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REEL

HACK ODD, AGGSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

at the United---at the League of Nations, '28, the  
Three Power Naval Conference and then in the thirties,  
the General Disarmament Conference. I was at all of  
those meetings and we ran against---sort of the basic  
issue, do you have to settle some of the grave political  
issues before you can have disarmament? That is, create  
a climate in which the flower grows and blossoms, or do  
you settle political issues by getting disarmament? They  
never solve that issue. They haven't solved it yet.  
Are we going to get disarmament with the Soviet Union  
before we kind of decide on a basis on which we can live  
together, which means some kind of a political settlement?  
Personally, I'm afraid that we do, but nevertheless, I  
recognize the need of exploring all the possibilities.  
When I was working on this, there was no nuclear problem.  
There was no problem that civilization was going to---  
could be destroyed by a mistake by/<sup>a</sup>reckless act. and  
now we have that grave issue and I think everything  
should be done to see if anything could be accomplished,  
but I'm not one of the optimists, I regret to say.

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REAR.

BACK ONE, BOSSI EVEN

DULLES CONTINUED:

May I just tell a little story in that connection? I---  
in Geneva, we were working on a theory. I've forgotten  
who inaugurated it, whether it was of American origin,  
or others, that you should define armaments---put  
armaments in two classes, offensive, defensive. And  
everybody would get rid of offensive armaments and only  
keep defensive armaments and then everything would be  
fine. So, we organized committees to deal with the  
subject and we had a committee for naval and ground  
and air types of armaments and there was a great hassle.  
Those that had submarines said, "Submarines are the most  
defensive" and those that didn't have them, said, "They  
were the most offensive." and we didn't make very much  
progress, but I remember on day---I was a member of the  
arms, the ...<sup>Q.A.A.</sup>... Commission and we were debating the  
qualification of aircraft that would be of an offensive  
or a defensive character and somebody introduced a  
resolution to the general effect---mind you, this was  
back in '31 or 2 when aviation was still in its infancy  
and a resolution was adopted to the effect that all airc

- 63 F -

REEL

MACR ODD, ROSSI EVEN

**DULLES CONTINUED:**

that exceeded a certain gross weight, that had a range in excess of a certain number of kilometers and that had a ceiling above fourteen thousand feet would be defensive, or offensive as the case may be. If they exceeded those limits, they're offensive. If they're under it, they're defensive. Well, we were debating there for some time and one of the delegates in the back of the room was trying to get the attention of the chairman and finally he was recognized and the chairman said, "The delegate from Bolivia will address the meeting." And he said, "Mr. Chairman, I must protest against these qualifications that have been introduced here, because if you accept these limitations, my country can't have any aircraft, because our only airport is about 14,000 feet high." That ended that particular ---well the whole thing was foolish and it was dismissed, so my experience in disarmament has been a discouraging one, but I think Eric, we've got to press on. We've got to explore every possibility.

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REEL

MACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

SEVAREY:

The Russians---

DULLES:

--hopeless as it--

SEVAREY:

have a phobia about the security of their country that always stopped the inspection proposals. Is there some possibility that this whole science of satellites and so on may enable us to leap over that, so that there could be inspection of every country, whether a country likes it or not?

DULLES:

It's perfectly true that the Soviets consider that their ability to maintain great zones of security and secrecy is considered by them as a major asset. It's like the value of a hundred bombers, or a hundred missiles, or whatever it may be. It is---it is just a concrete asset to their security. If they can within that area place missile sites (in?) these areas, because there are many of them---

END OF REELS (TAPE)